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Impact Evaluation

United States Agency for International Development

PROVIDING EMERGENCY AID TO HAITI

In the grip of a predatory military regime that in 1991 toppled a democratically elected government, Haitians suffered hardship even beyond the norm. A U.S.–led economic embargo that sought, unsuccessfully, to oust the regime also caused widespread deprivation. Emergency assistance provided by USAID and others succeeded in ensuring the survival of the most vulnerable poor.

SUMMARY

This evaluation assesses the effectiveness of USAID emergency assistance in response to Haiti’s complex humanitarian emergency during 1991–96. Data collection and analysis were carried out by a five-person interdisciplinary team, mostly in Haiti during 15–31 July 1998.

The evaluation examines three issues: 1) the effect of USAID emergency assistance on saving lives and alleviating suffering, 2) its effect on political tensions associated with the complex emergency, and 3) its effect on Haiti’s long-term economic development. In addition to reviewing documents, the team interviewed people in the United States and Haiti. Urban and rural site visits and interviews with beneficiaries provided information on people-level impact.

Haiti’s history is characterized by almost two centuries of widespread poverty, political authoritarianism, and conflict. The army historically has been the nation’s political

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arbitrator, and violence the means of change. This has created a skewed economy and a society in which a small, wealthy elite controls the poor majority. The elite's defense of this status quo has been a critical obstacle to Haiti's economic and political development. Substantial foreign aid during the 1970s and 1980s had little effect on the country's stagnant economy and pervasive poverty, mainly owing to the country's dictatorial, predatory government. Haiti's first democratic elections made Jean-Bertrand Aristide president in early 1991. Seven months later Aristide was overthrown by a military coup d'état. A period of turmoil, political repression, and human rights abuses followed.

In late 1991 the international community imposed an economic embargo on Haiti. In retrospect, the embargo did not have its intended effect—removing the military junta—but did have grave effects on Haiti's poor. Humanitarian assistance, much of it food aid, flooded in to counteract and help mitigate those negative effects. In late 1994 a U.S.-led multinational force landed in Haiti to restore democratic governance. The embargo was lifted, and Aristide returned to power.

Humanitarian effects. The emergency exacerbated Haitians' poverty. Urban factory workers lost their jobs. Income from remittances fell. Increased fuel prices disrupted marketing systems and reduced access to essential services, especially health care. Prices of staple foods increased, as did malnutrition rates and food insecurity.

The United States provided increased emergency assistance during this period. By 1995, as many as 1.3 million Haitians, 16 percent of the population, were receiving food aid. In addition to food relief, the United States 1) supported short-term employment generation to provide income and rehabilitate infrastructure; 2) supplied agricultural inputs to support food production and fuel to facilitate the distribu-

tion of food, medicine, and essential services; and 3) provided small grants to fund micro-projects designed to support grass-roots democratic processes.

Although the embargo worsened Haitians' historically poor nutritional status and marginal food security, food relief helped to palliate their adverse effects. Survey data indicate that malnutrition rates for children under 5 rose during the crisis but had begun to decline by 1996. Rates of severe and moderate malnutrition remain high, but they probably would have been higher without food and medical assistance, particularly among children. U.S. emergency assistance therefore did help save lives and alleviate suffering.

Political impact. The *embargo* was intended to impose and maintain political pressure on the de facto government. The *emergency assistance*, by contrast, was intended to alleviate economic pressure on the vulnerable population. It did so. But at the same time, the assistance reduced the embargo's political pressure on the military regime, working counter, to some extent, to the policy of economic isolation.

Control over relief food in resource-poor Haiti became a new source of tension, power, and violent competition. It also generated opportunities for misuse, opportunistic diversion, and political exploitation. Despite this, USAID, the involved nongovernmental organizations, and the Haitian communities demonstrated their ability to respond successfully to the emergency under difficult political, security, and logistic conditions.

Links to economic development. U.S. emergency assistance not only met humanitarian needs but also had some impact on Haiti's economic development. One initiative, the Jobs Creation project, simultaneously generated employment and rehabilitated infrastructure. Activities funded by the Agency's Office of Foreign Di-

saster Assistance provided agricultural inputs (seeds and tools) to some farmers. That reduced decapitalization and loss of productive assets and helped the farmers maintain production and decrease their long-term dependence on external assistance. Food assistance provided through school feeding and maternal and child health centers contributed indirectly to long-term development by enhancing human capital. Microprojects funded by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives helped lay the foundation for future economic development.

However, since short-term relief generally takes precedence over long-term development, the emergency assistance programs had little lasting economic impact. This is not surprising, because relief programs generally are not intended to achieve long-term sustainable development.

Conclusions. Haiti's complex emergency was not caused by ethnic hostility or civil war. Instead, the economic embargo imposed by the international community in response to the 1991 coup and subsequent terror and political repression created the need for humanitarian assistance. USAID and the nongovernmental organizations provided sufficient quantities of appropriately targeted emergency assistance to help ensure the survival of the country's vulnerable poor. At its peak, the international community was feeding one of seven Haitians each day and providing three fourths of the country's health care. In the absence of emergency assistance, more Haitians would have died, suffered from debilitating health conditions, or fled the country, many as boat people.

Providing massive quantities of emergency food aid also helped maintain social calm and mitigate political instability. It reduced the probability of food riots by acting as a steam valve. However, it also had the unintended negative effect of reducing pressure on the repressive military regime, thereby working

against the primary purpose of the embargo. Emergency food aid was distributed to the intended beneficiaries with only minimal diversion. Still, control over the food sometimes became a source of violent competition—either for its direct value as food or as a source of political power.

Because the crisis and urgency of the moment make long-term objectives secondary, short-term relief programs as a rule do not seek to achieve sustainable development. For example, the Jobs Creation project generated short-term employment opportunities for the poor, but the infrastructure that was rehabilitated was often not durable or maintained. Similarly, planning for future governance activities had low priority during the emergency. As a result, Haiti's public sector and institutional infrastructure in 1998 remained inadequate to manage the country's development. By contrast, agricultural production inputs that were provided as emergency assistance enabled some farmers to maintain their means of livelihood.

HAITI'S LEGACY: OPPRESSION, POVERTY

Haiti has almost no history of democratic governance or strong public institutions. Instead, during its nearly 200-year history, oppressive governments have favored the rich at the expense of the poor. By the 1980s, only 1 percent of the population controlled 45 percent of the economy, and three out of four Haitians lived in abject poverty (Haggerty 1991). The country's military has controlled a subservient police, and both institutions have engaged in widespread and systematic human rights abuses with nearly complete impunity (Washington Office on Latin America 1997). This situation was exemplified by both the dictatorship of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier (1957–71), which supported a wealthy elite backed by the

army and paramilitary groups, and the subsequent regime of Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. The latter’s departure in 1986 was only a prelude to a five-year power struggle characterized by even worse conditions (World Bank 1998b).

Recent History

Haiti’s recent history can be divided into three distinct periods: 1) the immediate post-Duvalier struggle for change, including the 1991 coup (February 1986 through September 1991); 2) the period of Haitian military rule (October 1991 through September 1994); and 3) the period of external military intervention, peacekeeping, democratic restoration, and reconstruction (October 1994 through January 1996).

1986–91. From February 1986 until March 1990, Haiti experienced an unparalleled political crisis marked by the rise and fall of four military-dominated governments as the country struggled for a democratic alternative. In December 1990, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected by a landslide as Haiti’s 44th president. He assumed power in February 1991. But seven months later the country’s first democratic elections were overturned by a military coup. President Aristide left the country and did not return until October 1994, three years later.

1991–94. The second period, arguably the most violent, was marked by turmoil, massive internal displacement, and migration. Although never an all-out civil war, the 1991–94 crisis bore all the hallmarks of a complex emergency, with political, social, and economic collapse (World Bank 1998b). Repression and corruption increased under the de facto military government. Human rights violations swelled to unprecedented levels, prompting a series of

UN-backed sanctions including the U.S.–led international embargo. By September 1994 an estimated 300,000 of Haiti’s seven million people were displaced internally; another 60,000 to 70,000 were refugees, some as the highly publicized boat people fleeing to the United States (World Bank 1998b); thousands had fled across the border to the Dominican Republic; and 4,000 had been killed (Dupuy 1997). (The exodus has continued: in June 1998 the *Washington Post* reported more than a hundred boat people were picked up at sea and returned to Haiti.)

1994–96. The third period began with the September 1994 landing of a 22,000-man U.S.–led multinational force to ensure the departure of the military regime, restore to office Haiti’s elected authorities, and establish a secure and stable environment. Aristide returned to Haiti a month later, UN sanctions were lifted, and new hopes of “nation building” flourished. The country held municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections during 1995 and 1996. Aristide demobilized the army and disbanded remnants of the brutal Tonton Macoute, a personal police force formed in 1961 by the elder Duvalier. Meanwhile, the multinational force instituted a weapons buy-back program (though many ex-soldiers still retain arms, and common crime remains a threat.)


Haiti’s governments, particularly its 1991–94 de facto government, have left the country with few experienced policymakers, leaders, managers, or technicians. As of the end of 1998, the country had had no prime minister since June 1997, because a polarized parliament had failed to approve any of President René García Prével’s three nominees. The procedural deadlock between the president and parliament likely reflects strains associated with Haiti’s nascent democratic institutions: the new and relatively inexperienced legislators exercise their constitutional prerogatives to the letter.

Causes of the Complex Emergency

Most studies have singled out predatory governance as the principal cause of Haiti's conflict; ethnic and ideological factors appear less important. A history of predatory governance has resulted in a two-class society: a small minority characterized by growing wealth, and a large majority, marked by growing poverty. Although the international community provided substantial aid during the 1970s and 1980s, the assistance had little apparent effect on economic growth, which was stagnant, or on poverty (World Bank 1998b). McGowan (1997) reports that "for more than 20 years, neither the sheer scale of assistance, nor the constant restructuring of policy, nor the massive amount of foreign expertise brought in by donors to restructure Haiti's institutions has succeeded in furthering development or improving the lives of the poor." The reasons probably stem from historical structural problems of dysfunctional governance.

During 1991–94, overall conditions deteriorated. Gross domestic product fell by 35 percent over this period, and inflation increased to 50 percent by 1994 (Buttari 1997). An estimated 143,000 jobs were lost in the private sector (Maguire 1996). Many of the already small middle class emigrated, and Haitian society became even more polarized into the rich and the poor. In 1992, as shown in table 1 (next page), international assistance to Haiti was reduced substantially and consisted mainly of emergency humanitarian relief (World Bank 1998b). U.S. bilateral assistance was nearly halved, from \$66 million in 1991 to \$38 million in 1992. The World Bank and Inter-American

Development Bank suspended operations altogether because Haiti had stopped servicing its external debt. In late 1994, when U.S. troops entered Haiti and Aristide was restored to power, the national treasury was empty. The inflation-adjusted value of the minimum wage was less than it had been 10 years earlier. Per capita GNP was \$250.



“Most studies have singled out predatory governance as the principal cause of Haiti’s conflict; ethnic and ideological factors appear less important.”

With the return of Aristide, external assistance increased dramatically, mostly from the United States. U.S. assistance increased nearly 10-fold, from \$57 million in 1993 to \$541 million in 1994 (World Bank 1998b). But that was not enough to reverse the damage done by the economic embargo, the governmental transition, and the breakdown in civil authority. To make matters worse, in November 1994 tropical storm Gordon hit Haiti and

caused more than a thousand deaths (USAID 1996).

USAID’s Humanitarian Response

USAID responded to the emergencies (both man-made and natural) with an expanded humanitarian assistance program that included food aid, health assistance, and provision of water and sanitation. The USAID mission in Haiti and the Bureau for Humanitarian Response in Washington (including the Office of Food for Peace, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, and the Office of Transition Initiatives) managed the response. Most of the relief was provided in fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

The PL 480 title II program (including both the regular program and a new supplementary

**Table 1. Official Development Assistance to Haiti,
US\$ Millions, 1986–88 to 1995**

Source	1986–88	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
United States	72.7	68.0	50.0	66.0	38.0	57.0	541.0	382.0
Other bilateral	53.2	70.6	67.1	73.5	38.8	39.6	56.1	127.6
Total bilateral	125.9	138.6	117.1	139.5	76.8	96.6	597.1	509.6
World Bank	30.2	10.0	12.0	8.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	39.4
Inter-American Development Bank	3.8	9.9	11.7	6.7	0.5	0.0	–15.5	67.4
World Food Program	2.7	3.9	1.7	0.6	3.3	3.7	2.0	4.6
Other multilateral	16.4	35.0	29.8	27.1	20.7	23.4	17.7	109.6
Total multilateral	53.1	58.8	55.2	42.4	24.7	27.1	4.2	221.0
Total assistance	179.0	197.4	172.3	181.9	101.5	123.7	601.3	730.6

Sources: World Bank 1998b, p. 58, citing Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients,” various editions. Also: USAID 1997.

emergency program) was increased by 60 percent, from \$15.4 million in 1993 to \$24.6 million in 1994 (see table 2). In 1995 the program was increased by another 37 percent, to \$33.6 million (including both regular and emergency food aid). By January 1995 food was reaching a target population of 1.3 million people through 3,100 distribution points throughout the country (USAID 1995). Three full-time food aid monitors were then (and are now) USAID/Haiti’s principal eyes and ears in monitoring both regular and emergency food distribution at these centers (USAID 1996).

Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) implemented the humanitarian response. Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) operated approximately 1,100 feeding centers in poor urban neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince and in northern and central Haiti. Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) worked in the northwest and Artibonite regions through some 1,200 school feeding centers as well as hospitals, clinics, and other distribution

centers. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) operated 800 feeding centers in the Port-au-Prince area and in the south and southwest. International Lifeline also implemented food aid programs for two years (USAID 1995).

The UN World Food Program (WFP) responded to the emergency with commodities partly funded by the United States. Working through local and European nongovernmental organizations, WFP provided food to the northeast region, targeting 100,000 people (41,000 vulnerable children, 22,000 pregnant and lactating mothers, and 37,000 destitute citizens). It also supported 200 school distribution centers (USAID 1995).

The PVOs distributed food commodities to beneficiaries under a variety of programs. Two of these were established in direct response to the crisis: community kitchens (*cantines populaires*), which provided cooked food to vulnerable groups, and a program that provided uncooked food rations to poor families with children un-

der 5, pregnant and lactating women, and the elderly. Traditional food aid programs also were expanded: maternal and child health centers that provided dry food rations and nutrition education to at-risk women and children; a school feeding program that provided a cooked meal on school premises to students; and a food-for-work program that developed or maintained rural infrastructure (USAID 1995).*

In addition to emergency food aid provided by the Bureau for Humanitarian Response/Food for Peace (table 2), BHR/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) awarded seven grants to PVOs totaling \$5.4 million. Catholic Relief Services, the principal grantee, received \$2.3 million to distribute essential drugs and medical supplies, supply agricultural inputs (tools, seeds, and fertilizer), and contribute to UNICEF's oral rehydration therapy program and measles immunization campaign. OFDA also supported efforts to purify drinking water throughout Haiti, purchase equipment for the Port-au-Prince municipal water system, and buy fuel needed to transport emergency assistance to beneficiaries. The Pan American Development Foundation also played a pivotal role in the humanitarian response by implementing the \$38 million Jobs Creation project.

*Food-for-work programs, mainly supported by ADRA, increased over time. In 1994 they represented 15 percent of ADRA's food aid; in 1995, 23 percent; and in 1996, 27 percent. By 1995, CARE was also supporting a small food-for-work program; CRS is expected to follow suit in 1999.

Finally, BHR/Office of Transition Initiatives provided \$17.3 million in 1994–95 to support Haiti's transition by funding demobilization of the armed forces (not covered in this assessment) and over 1,900 microprojects designed to bridge the gap between relief and development.

This Impact Evaluation covers the period 1991–96. It does not cover postconflict nonemergency programs. It considers three potential effects of the emergency response: its humanitarian effects, whether or not it had an effect on political tensions, and issues associated with the “relief to development” linkage.

RESULTS

The evaluation asks three basic questions: 1) To what extent has emergency assistance provided by the United States saved lives and alleviated suffering? 2) How has this assistance affected hostilities or political tensions associated with the complex emergency? 3) Has it contributed to long-term economic development?

**Table 2. PL 480 Food Aid Levels, US\$ Millions
And Metric Tons, Haiti, FY 1992–97**

Program	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Regular (\$)	16.533	15.169	15.891	19.748	23.773	11.698
Other emergency (\$)	0	.262	8.675	13.855	0	0
Total (\$)	16.533	15.431	24.566	33.603	23.773	11.698
Total (MT)	40,429	32,697	55,970	79,010	50,520	28,110

Source: USAID/Haiti.

Note: Total includes value of commodities, ocean freight and internal transport, and storage and handling. Commodities include soy fortified bulgur (57 percent of the total supplied during 1992–96), green whole peas (17 percent), wheat–soy blend (11 percent), and vegetable oil (10 percent). The remaining 5 percent consists of pinto beans, bulgur, corn–soy blend, and milk.

Humanitarian Effects: Saving Lives And Alleviating Suffering

As indicated above, predatory governance (and the associated widespread poverty) looms large as the principal cause of Haiti's complex humanitarian emergency. In rural areas, 80 percent of the population are poor (\$220 per capita income) and two thirds are extremely poor (\$160 per capita income) (World Bank 1998a). The highest levels of poverty are in the north and northwest, where 91 percent of households are poor and 81 percent are extremely poor. These levels of extreme poverty are among the highest anywhere in the world.

Seventy percent of the population, though engaged primarily in agriculture, are net food purchasers. They buy 85 percent of their food needs, receive 3 percent as food aid, and produce only 12 percent (World Bank 1998a). Because agricultural production and farm incomes are low, producers also work off-farm, where they earn 25 to 41 percent of their total income. The large majority of Haitian households therefore have little purchasing power even in normal times and virtually no cushion against a crisis.

The 1991–94 crisis worsened rural poverty. The assembly plants in Port-au-Prince closed and 400,000 of the urban poor returned to the countryside. That increased pressure on rural households' scarce resources, including food stocks (Naval 1995). Prices of staple foods more than doubled (USAID/Haiti 1992–96), while effective demand dropped because of lower incomes. High fuel prices raised transportation costs, reducing consumers' access to markets and producers' ability to sell their commodities. Credit funded by development projects was cut off, costs of health care and medicines rose, and income from remittances fell.

Urban and rural Haitians interviewed during this assessment described how the crisis af-

ected their lives. Urban women reported that there was no work, that their children's schools and feeding programs closed, that it was difficult to buy food and pay the rent, and that their children lost weight and became thin. They said flour mixed with water and salt became a staple food and that people fought and were injured when food aid was distributed. In rural areas people reported that wage labor opportunities and incomes decreased while prices increased, that people could not afford to pay for health care or school fees, that it was difficult to feed their children, and that people or animals were used to transport goods because commercial transportation became too expensive. As one person summed up the situation, "Life was expensive: one earned less and spent more. There was no work, no money, and no food."

Findings

Indicators of the magnitude of Haiti's humanitarian emergency include changes in the national food supply, food prices, and malnutrition rates for children under 5.

National food supply. Haiti has a structural food deficit that makes the country dependent on imports. The deficit is due to declining domestic production that in 1990 generated 85 percent of national food needs but now provides only about 55 percent in a year of "normal" production (IDB 1994, World Bank 1998a) (see table 3). Commercial food imports doubled during 1980–95 (World Bank 1998a), so that in a normal year they now provide 32 percent of national requirements. Food aid provides 6 percent, which leaves a food deficit of approximately 7 percent in a normal year.

Haiti's food deficit increased during the crisis years. During 1992–94, domestic production was reported at 90 to 94 percent of normal at the national level (table 3 assumes 92 percent of normal, or 828,000 metric tons a year). Commercial imports decreased by one third to about

Table 3. Haiti's National Food Supply During a Normal Year and a Crisis Year, Metric Tons and Percent

Food Requirements and Source of Supply	Normal Year		Crisis Year	
	Metric Tons ^a	Percent	Metric Tons ^a	Percent
National food requirements ^b	1,635,000	100	1,635,000	100
Domestic production	900,000	55	828,000	51
Commercial imports	525,000	32	350,000	21
Food aid	100,000	6	129,000	8
Food deficit	110,000	7	328,000	20

Source: World Bank 1998a; figures are rounded.

^aCorn equivalent.

^bAssumes 2,260 calories per person per day for Haiti's total population estimated at 7,140,000 in 1995.

350,000 metric tons a year (World Bank 1998a). Food aid increased by an average of 29 percent during 1993–95 to about 129,000 metric tons a year (World Bank 1998a, WFP 1998)—but this was insufficient to compensate for decreased domestic production and commercial imports. As a result, Haiti's food deficit increased to an estimated 20 percent of national food requirements, nearly three times the deficit in a normal year.

Food prices. With commodities scarce, food prices rose. Table 4 reports average prices for six staples in Port-au-Prince at three points in time: September 1991, at the time of the coup; three years later, September 1994, when U.S. troops were sent to Haiti; and almost two years after that, June 1996, when the emergency was over.

Commodity prices in all three urban areas generally rose sharply during 1991–94 as a result of the

embargo. In Port-au-Prince, rice prices increased by 126 percent; bean prices, by 167 percent; corn prices, 184 percent; and millet prices,

Table 4. Average Price of Food Staples In Port-Au-Prince, Central Haiti, Haitian 'Dollars' per Pound, 1991–96

Commodity	9/91	9/94	Percent Change (1991–94)	6/96	Percent Change (1994–96)
Rice	2.80	6.32	126	5.63	– 11
Beans	3.28	8.77	167	8.22	– 6
Corn	1.37	3.89	184	3.50	– 10
Oil ^a	2.00	2.50	25	2.00	– 20
Millet	1.43	3.72	160	3.56	– 4
Plantain	1.55	2.15	39	2.97	38

Source: USAID/Haiti, 1992–96. USAID/Haiti's first "Monitoring Report" was released in October 1991. It was updated monthly for three years, then once every two months, then once a quarter. These reports, prepared under the direction of John Currelly, included not only food price data disaggregated by region, but also malnutrition rates (see table 5) and other emergency-related data.

Note: The gourd is the Haitian currency unit. In 1998 one U.S. dollar equaled 17 gourdes. However, prices are often expressed in Haitian "dollars"; 1 Haitian dollar equals 5 gourdes, or US\$0.29.

^aFor oil, the price is expressed per unit of volume (3.0–3.5 ounces), not per unit of weight (pounds).

160 percent (USAID/Haiti 1992–94). Price increases for oil and plantain were more moderate, 25 percent and 39 percent, respectively.* By September 1994, average food prices had peaked in all three cities for all commodities except plantain. Prices fluctuated throughout 1995, and by June 1996 they were 4 to 20 percent lower than in September 1994 (except for plantain prices, which were 38 percent higher).

Even though average food prices in Port-au-Prince decreased during 1994–96, they were still more than twice their 1991 levels (except for oil, which remained constant). Prices for millet and plantain, staple foods for the poor, increased by 149 and 92 percent, respectively, during 1991–96. People interviewed consistently reported that provisioning their households was more difficult in 1996 (and even in 1998) than before or during the embargo. Thus, one long-term effect of the emergency was to reduce Haitians' already low purchasing power and exacerbate their already precarious food security.

Malnutrition rates in Haiti have dropped during the past two decades but remain high. As measured by height-for-age, 40 percent of children under 5 were moderately stunted from chronic malnutrition in 1978; 32 percent in 1995 (Ianotti 1997). (Children under 5 are always the reference.) Nine percent of children were moderately wasted (as determined by weight-for-height) in 1978; 8 percent, in 1995. These rates are high enough to warrant “urgent action,” and they show “the extreme effects of the recent political events on young children” (World Bank 1998a). Daily per capita calorie intake is currently only 75 percent of the amount recommended by the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization.

Like food prices, malnutrition rates are a key indicator of the effects of a complex emergency. Most studies agree that Haiti’s historically high malnutrition rates increased in 1991–94 owing to the combination of economic stress and a

total breakdown of the public health sector (IDB 1994, Ianotti 1997, World Bank 1998a). A Haitian physician reported seeing a greater prevalence of emaciated children during the crisis than at any other time. Children may be hungry now, she said, but at that time they were starving.

Data from USAID’s monitoring reports also show this trend but indicate the changes may not have been significant (see table 5). Nationally, 50 percent of children were of normal nutritional status in 1992. This figure increased to 52 percent in 1993 but then declined to 49 percent in 1994 and to 47 percent in 1995. It then rose to 51 percent in 1996. Conversely, national rates of moderate and severe malnutrition increased in 1994 (to 18.9 percent) and 1995 (to 19.2 percent) then decreased in 1996 (to 18.1 percent) (USAID/Haiti 1992–96).

However, national malnutrition rates mask regional differences. Nationally, as shown in table 5, severe malnutrition increased from 3.3 percent (1992) to 3.9 percent (1994) to 4.1 percent (1996) (USAID/Haiti 1992–96). In the northwest, though, it increased from 11.7 percent (1992), to 14.4 percent (1994), then decreased to 10.8 percent (1996) (USAID/Haiti 1992–96).†

*In the northwest (Port-de-Paix), average prices more than doubled between December 1992 and September 1994 for corn and oil, and they increased by more than 50 percent for rice and beans. Price increases for plantain were more moderate (37 percent); data for millet were not available. In the south (Les Cayes), average prices more than doubled during the same period for beans, oil, and millet; they increased by more than 50 percent for rice and corn; they decreased by 20 percent for plantain (USAID/Haiti 1992–94).

†The draft Working Paper for this evaluation disaggregates malnutrition rates regionally. It shows that the northwest, and to a lesser extent the south, have higher rates of severe malnutrition than other regions of the country. It also shows that Port-au-Prince was the only region where rates of severe malnutrition were higher in 1996 than in 1992, which may indicate the long-term effects of the emergency on Haiti’s urban poor.

Table 5. Nutritional Status of Children Under 5, Haiti, 1992–96, Percent

Year	Normal Nutritional Status	Levels of Malnutrition ^a			
		Mild	Moderate	Severe	Moderate and Severe
1992	50	33	14	3.3	17.3
1993	52	33	12	3.2	15.2
1994	49	33	15	3.9	18.9
1995	47	33	15	4.2	19.2
1996	51	32	14	4.1	18.1

Source: USAID/Haiti 1992–96. These data should be regarded as approximate, as the sites and methods of data collection were not standardized during the emergency.

^aBased on weight-for-age; “mild” and “moderate” figures are rounded.

Human health and Haiti’s already inadequate health care sector deteriorated during the emergency. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, “the little progress previously achieved [was] lost,” and there was a “total breakdown of the public health infrastructure” (IDB 1994). The embargo reduced medical imports and stopped the child vaccination program. That, according to one Haitian physician in the Ministry of Health, led to an increase of measles, meningitis, rabies, and other diseases. The morbidity rate nationwide for children under 5 appears to have peaked in 1993 at 152,000 reported cases of five diseases (diarrheal diseases, fever/malaria, measles, typhoid, acute respiratory infections); by 1995 it had decreased by 19 percent to 123,000 reported cases (USAID/Haiti 1992–96).

In response to these conditions, the United States increased emergency food assistance, funded programs to provide short-term employment and agricultural inputs, and supplied fuel and medicine.

Food relief. To address the problem of malnutrition, in particular, international donors increased food aid deliveries by a third. Food aid averaged 95,500 metric tons per year during

1990–92, compared with an average of 126,700 metric tons per year during 1993–95 (WFP 1998). The United States contributed an average of 68 percent of total food aid; the European Community contributed 19 percent; and the World Food Program, Canada, and France contributed the rest (World Bank 1998a).

Three major U.S. nongovernmental organizations with decades of experience in Haiti (CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and Adventist Development and Relief Agency) implemented most of the emergency assistance efforts funded by the United States. These NGOs rapidly switched from implementing long-term development assistance programs to large-scale short-term emergency assistance programs. According to self-reported figures, their beneficiary levels nearly doubled during the emergency. CARE initially targeted 300,000 beneficiaries, which increased to 620,000 during the emergency. CRS initially targeted 225,000 people during the embargo period, which rose to 500,000 at the peak of the emergency. ADRA targeted 336,000 people at the height of the emergency, 50 percent more than its normal level of 224,000. In 1995, according to the World Bank (1998a), food aid was reaching 1.3 million direct beneficiaries, or 16 percent of Haiti’s population.

Efforts to target Haiti’s vulnerable populations generally worked well, but the threat of looting and armed theft was always present. ADRA, for example, distributed dry rations in the low-income neighborhood of Cité Jasmin in Port-au-Prince for only six months in 1992 because of violence. CRS also had difficulties in urban areas, particularly in the poor neighborhood of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince, where food aid

supplies were pillaged in 1994. This looting may reflect, in part, the reportedly widespread Haitian belief that the food was a “gift” for everybody, a belief that made targeting more difficult. Still, the estimated amount of leakage, 5 to 10 percent, was seen as normal. The protection provided by U.S. military convoys no doubt contributed to the relatively low rate.

Employment generation and agricultural inputs. The Jobs Creation project was implemented during 1993–96 primarily to offset the embargo’s economic pressures. It created almost half a million person-months of short-term employment during its 34 months of operation, of which 20 percent was for women (Brown 1996). The project’s secondary objective was to rehabilitate productive infrastructure, including roads, urban sanitation, and irrigation and drainage systems. But maintenance and long-term sustainability of the infrastructure was not a project objective, and over time the infrastructure deteriorated.

Another emergency activity, funded by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and administered by CRS, was designed to help support agricultural production and reduce decapitalization of farm households. The project loaned seed and fertilizer to farmers and sold them tools at half price. Some 13,000 farming households and 47 farmer associations participated (Naval 1995).

Fuel and medicine. OFDA also provided funding so the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) could purchase fuel necessary to deliver emergency health services, potable water, and food to more than 400 health centers throughout Haiti. In the absence of any government health care delivery system, this was an important contribution to the overall humanitarian assistance effort. The medicines and health services helped combat transmissible diseases, respond to medical and surgical emergencies, and support maternal and child health care and water and sanitation services.

PAHO was officially designated by the UN to manage the distribution program through a coordinating committee consisting of representatives of the Organization of American States, the UN Development Program, international donors, and NGOs. As the clearly designated, agreed-upon central authority, PAHO was able to deliver humanitarian assistance more effectively.

Conclusions

Although most studies agree that the embargo seriously aggravated the country’s historically high malnutrition rates, they also conclude that emergency food relief alleviated that effect (World Bank 1998a, USAID/Haiti 1992–96, IDB 1994). The World Bank, quoting Ianotti, concludes that “there is a clear consensus that food distribution and other relief efforts implemented by NGOs during the 1991–95 period have contributed significantly to reducing the negative impact of the embargo” (World Bank 1998a). U.S. emergency assistance, both food and nonfood, helped people survive. As one NGO food aid representative stated, U.S. humanitarian assistance “contributed to maintaining a very limited level of food security, in the absence of which malnutrition and social unrest would have prevailed.”

According to rural producers, assistance in the form of agricultural inputs (the OFDA-funded CRS program) was useful because it contributed to food production. However, they also viewed food aid as critical, because it enabled farmers to invest their scarce resources in production rather than consumption and to keep (rather than sell) their productive capital and farm implements. Others reported that improving local roads through the Jobs Creation project was the most important result of emergency assistance. All those interviewed believed that food assistance helped maintain social calm in a time of chaos.

The physicians interviewed believed that emergency assistance helped maintain precrisis health levels and that food aid was an important contribution to peoples' survival, particularly children. Although NGOs that worked in poor urban neighborhoods and resource-poor rural areas reported some severe malnutrition, that was generally the exception. This conclusion is supported by national-level survey data that show no large decline in nutritional levels during the emergency (Macro International Inc. 1995, USAID/Haiti 1992–96)—at least not as large a decline as many people expected. The consensus is that mortality and malnutrition rates would have increased in the absence of food aid. Thus, U.S. emergency assistance did help save lives and alleviate suffering during Haiti's complex emergency.

Political Effects Of U.S. Humanitarian Assistance

The overarching objective of humanitarian assistance is to save lives and alleviate suffering. In some cases, though, it can affect political hostilities or tensions often associated with complex emergencies. These political effects can be positive or negative, intended or unintended. In Haiti, U.S. humanitarian aid had explicit political objectives that were substantially achieved. But it also had unintended political effects that to some extent worked at cross-purposes with the embargo.

Findings

For the United States and the international community, the primary, explicit political objective of humanitarian assistance was to prevent food deprivation. The objective was achieved, but at the same time it had the potential to undermine pressure from the embargo to oust the de facto regime. It is true that rates of malnutrition in children under 5 increased during the

emergency years (table 5), as did the incidence of measles and other diseases because of reduced imports of vaccines and other medicines. However, Haitians (including villagers, academics, and senior figures with a grasp of the country's overall experience) were unanimous in judging that the modest deterioration in these basic indicators of well-being would have been substantially greater if not for humanitarian aid. The alleviation of food shortages made possible by the assistance also helped reduce the incidence of emigration by boat people.

Thus, humanitarian assistance served as a safety valve during a period of broad economic distress. Among other things, this distress was characterized by a sharp rise in urban unemployment when the embargo forced closure of the export assembly sector in Port-au-Prince. Providing food aid reduced the potential for food riots and arguably had a dampening effect on political tension, quite apart from the effects of the de facto regime's deliberate use of terror. When the embargo by itself did not succeed in forcing the de facto regime to exit, the political objective of restoring elected civilian rule was accomplished in late 1994 through military intervention (Haass 1998).

Did emergency assistance enhance the ability of the de facto regime to withstand diplomatic pressures and the effects of the economic embargo—before the international community finally resorted to military force? Many Haitians believe this is the case. According to this view, exempting humanitarian aid from the embargo worked at cross-purposes with the policy of economic isolation. By reducing food distress, the assistance in effect dampened public pressure that might otherwise have risen to uncontrollable levels against the regime. Thus, the food aid may have delayed the intervention by external forces, intervention that finally proved

unavoidable in order to eject the Haitian military and return President Aristide to power.

(Assuming this “what if” early-intervention scenario was in fact feasible, this view implies that humanitarian aid, by stretching out the duration and extent of the emergency and the consequences for its victims, ironically could have caused more humanitarian distress than it alleviated. The point is speculative, of course, and raises issues beyond the scope of this assessment.)

Although the embargo was not watertight, it was effective enough to reduce severely the availability of fuel and other essential imported commodities and the ability of the internal transport system to move food from production to consumption areas. As a result, the large quantities of aid-financed food injected into resource-starved Haiti were conspicuous and highly valued—either for direct consumption or as a political tool for those who controlled its distribution. Control over access to food aid therefore became a new source of tension and power, and violent elements—local gangs or groups connected to political factions—hijacked food supplies. The mission of UN forces was consequently expanded to include conveying food supplies to prevent hijacking. U.S. forces also fanned out to the countryside to control the disintegrating Haitian armed forces and reduce the level of violence.

Urban homes and community buildings used for stockpiling food supplies were not immune from looting. When food was dropped off in urban neighborhoods for distribution by volunteers, fighting sometimes erupted among beneficiaries. Some municipal mayors favored supporters of one faction or another in the distribution of food aid or used their access to food to promote their personal aggrandizement. At the village level, CARE had to dismiss 5 percent of the volunteers who ran the feeding canteens because they were diverting supplies to family and friends who were not eligible to receive

food under the deprivation measurement criteria. As was noted earlier, a general view developed that the food aid was a gift to the people of Haiti and that everyone was entitled to some of it. That resulted in resentment among those not entitled under the criteria and in subsequent looting from stocks and trucks.

To their credit, the NGOs limited leakage and diversion (estimated at less than 10 percent) through regular monitoring, convoy protection, and timely adjustment of their stocking and distribution methods. Attendant violence, political exploitation, and local tensions were thus reduced to manageable if not minor proportions. These problems (probably unavoidable consequences of providing food during scarcity under turbulent social and political conditions) were more severe in the central parts of the country than in the northern and southern regions. Overall, the violence surrounding the food programs was relatively minor in the context of the violence inflicted by the de facto regime and arising out of the country’s general political crisis.

Conclusions

The United States provided emergency assistance to keep widespread deprivation caused by the economic embargo from producing a catastrophic fall in welfare among Haiti’s poor. The success of the program demonstrated the ability of USAID, the NGO implementing agencies, and local Haitian NGOs and communities to respond to a complex humanitarian emergency under difficult political, security, and logistic conditions. The assistance achieved its primary political and humanitarian objectives.

However, the injection of food into Haiti’s resource-starved economy also created incentives and opportunities for opportunistic diversion, misuse, political exploitation, and new community tensions. Flexibility in the administration of the program and cooperation of the multinational forces reduced these unintended con-

sequences to manageable proportions. The violence and social tensions surrounding food distribution were relatively minor compared with the violence and social distress that attended the political crisis.

Economic Effects: Relief to Development

With the UN-mandated embargo, USAID halted its development programs and most staff left the country. Development projects to support food security, income generation, and other activities were deemphasized in favor of programs to provide emergency assistance. Although these emergency programs were deliberately designed to respond to compelling short-term humanitarian needs, some also had implications for long-term economic development.

Findings

Emergency assistance contributed to economic development in three main ways: 1) employment generation, 2) agricultural production, and 3) human resource development (health and education). In addition, the Office of Transition Initiatives helped bridge the gap between relief and development by providing small grants to various organizations to support grass-roots democratic processes.

Employment generation. Over two million of Haiti's seven million people live in urban areas and depend entirely on wages and other nonfarm sources of income to purchase food. Even rural households produce, on average, only 28 percent of their food needs and rely on nonfarm sources of income to purchase the rest (World Bank 1998a). (Nonfarm sources of rural income include remittances sent by family members abroad, artisanal income, charcoal and wood sales, and other production and trade.) Thus, there was a need to increase both farm and nonfarm incomes in the context of

providing emergency assistance to meet nutritional needs (see page 8).

The Jobs Creation project was designed with this objective in mind. To achieve this goal (generating employment needed to maintain household incomes) as well as a secondary goal (improving infrastructure), the project funded soil conservation, road rehabilitation, and irrigation-ditch repair. At the same time, OFDA funds were used to provide agricultural inputs (seeds and tools) to some farmers (less than 10 percent of all farmers) who were selling their productive assets to buy food. These two emergency assistance programs provided relief in ways that helped maintain beneficiaries' incomes and food production. The intent was to reduce their dependence on short-term relief by providing essential elements needed for long-term development.

Under the Jobs Creation program, half a million person-months of short-term employment were created during a 34-month period. More than 120 individual projects were implemented, resulting in the repair of 1,600 kilometers (1,000 miles) of roads, 3,200 kilometers (2,000 miles) of irrigation canals, and 7,200 kilometers (4,500 miles) of soil conservation barriers (Pan American Development Foundation). Though the program achieved its main objective—employment creation—it might have had greater developmental impact had resources been used to purchase materials needed to construct better quality roads. Because it did not do so, the roads were not durable, and the benefits (reduced farm-to-market transport costs) were only temporary. Similarly, resources were not available for materials needed to rehabilitate or replace irrigation gates. Therefore, less farmland was irrigated than otherwise would have been possible.

But if these activities had been carefully tailored to meet technical specifications and thoroughly vetted at the community level, this may have involved delays. Beyond that, more durable


infrastructure often requires the purchase of materials (as distinct from labor), and the primary objective of generating employment may have been compromised. Although it is desirable not to ignore long-term development objectives when designing short-term emergency responses, it is often difficult to do both well. In any event, these activities probably helped prepare the way for longer term, more sustainable development in the future.

Agricultural production. The Jobs Creation project adopted Haiti's standard minimum wage. This ranged from 20 to 36 gourdes per day, which was two to four times the typical agricultural wage. (In 1998, 17 gourdes equaled US\$1.)

This led some analysts to conclude that the jobs project, by inflating the standard agricultural wage, made farming unprofitable and reduced food production (Richardson 1997, Lowenthal 1998). According to this reasoning, farmers were unable to pay laborers a higher wage and still make a profit.

It is true that the jobs project was implemented with little attention given to the demand for agricultural labor, but the project's effect on agricultural production appears minimal. According to the mission's monitoring reports, production did not decrease substantially during implementation of the project, mainly because there was a considerable surplus of unemployed farm labor (USAID/Haiti 1992–96). Agricultural wages did increase, but because of the labor surplus, they did not increase to the minimum wage paid by the jobs project. To the extent there were reduced harvests, this had more to do with the embargo (lack of cash to purchase agricultural inputs) and inefficient marketing (lack of fuel to transport inputs and commodities) than it did with agricultural labor constraints.

While wages have risen from two to four times their 1991 level, prices for most locally produced food commodities also have risen at a similar rate (table 4). And although agricultural production costs have risen since 1993, farmers and local analysts affirmed that this has not seriously reduced farm profitability and that land used for farming has not been taken out of production.



“CARE’s presence was critical in the northwest, where basic government services were (and still are) virtually absent.”

Human resource development. The food assistance itself had positive health and education effects that contributed indirectly to long-term economic development. Emergency food aid helped maintain the health of much of the working populace. Likewise, school feeding programs encouraged higher

rates of school attendance than otherwise would have been the case—reducing the adverse impact of falling levels of education on long-term economic growth (World Bank 1998a).

CARE's presence was critical in the northwest, where basic government services were (and still are) virtually absent. During Haiti's emergency, CARE greatly expanded its presence to become the largest single institution and largest employer in the region. As a result, CARE—rather than Haiti's public or private sectors—still provides the region's safety net. This suggests that when government institutional capability is extremely limited as it is in a historically predatory state, it may be necessary to rely on external agencies (NGOs) to provide basic health, education, and related public services.

Democratic processes. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives funds programs designed to bridge the gap between short-term relief (often managed by OFDA) and long-term development (typically managed by resident

USAID missions). In Haiti, OTI funded an \$11 million program, implemented by the International Office of Migration, that supported more than 1,900 microprojects over a 27-month period (September 1994 to December 1996). (This implies that, on average, more than two microprojects were initiated somewhere in the country each day during this period.) The U.S. military supported the OTI program by providing transportation, logistical support, and, by virtue of its presence, physical security.

The microprojects were explicitly designed to deliver assistance rapidly, have high visibility, and provide tangible benefits. Working with local communities and their newly elected leadership, staff of the International Office of Migration identified priority needs that the communities were willing to undertake jointly. The projects ranged from rehabilitation and construction of community schools, roads, markets, canals, and bridges to organization and implementation of literacy, public health, sanitation, reforestation, and civic education activities. Not only were the projects useful in themselves, but also they helped reinforce local governmental structures while emphasizing the importance of popular participation.

According to a midterm evaluation, “there is absolutely no doubt that this program has had unprecedented success in mobilizing highly valued resources to tens of thousands of needy beneficiaries all over Haiti” (Chandler 1996). The evaluation notes, however, that the emphasis was more on installation than on maintenance: “mechanisms for maintenance and repair of schools, pumps, roads, and the like were left without community management or resources.”

The effectiveness of local organizations still suffers in Haiti’s current (1998) climate of governmental deadlock. And it is questionable that the Haitian government will be able to provide needed resources anytime soon. Nevertheless, by encouraging responsive local governance

and supporting stability and democratic processes, OTI programs helped reduce political violence and provide legitimacy for the incoming democratic government. That, in turn, will help create the secure environment fundamental for long-term economic development.

Conclusions

Relief agencies found it difficult to build effective links between relief and development during Haiti’s emergency. This is understandable. They were working in an environment of social and economic chaos in which the goal of long-term sustainable development was eclipsed by the immediate short-term need for relief. And Haitians themselves were concerned primarily with physical security and survival rather than with development. Therefore, emergency assistance programs were generally designed with only incidental links to economic development, and thus their developmental impact was minimal.

Operationally, the link between relief and development is complicated by the lack of consensus on the appropriate strategy for Haiti’s long-term development. Some believe the country should encourage agricultural production in order to reduce dependency on food imports and stabilize food prices. Others believe Haiti cannot sustain increased agricultural production and should instead encourage non-farm growth in the manufacturing or processing sectors. Until the appropriate balance is sorted out, it will be difficult to design relief programs that effectively support long-term development.

In sum, employment generation activities provided short-term income benefits, but not permanent, off-farm sources of income. Similarly, rehabilitated infrastructure contributed to increased economic activity in the short term, but links to long-term economic development were tenuous at best. Efforts to improve physical security, reduce political instability, and plant

the seeds of democratic governance will no doubt prove critical in creating an environment conducive to Haiti's long-term economic development.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

Seven conclusions emerge from this assessment:

1. Economic sanctions. *Economic sanctions can cause or exacerbate a humanitarian crisis, requiring short-term emergency assistance and constraining long-term economic development.*

Unlike in many other countries, ethnic hostility or civil war was not the basis of Haiti's complex emergency. The economic embargo imposed by the international community in response to the 1991 coup d'état created the urgent need for humanitarian assistance.

2. Saving lives. *USAID and U.S. NGOs have the response and implementation capacity to deliver sufficient, appropriately targeted emergency assistance to help ensure the survival of a country's vulnerable poor.*

One half million to 1.3 million Haitians (as many as one in seven) were receiving food aid during 1991–96. In addition, USAID-funded NGOs were providing three fourths of the health care in the country. These actions helped control malnutrition, and although health conditions worsened, epidemics did not break out. Nutritional assessments indicate that children's nutritional status dipped during 1994 and 1995, but by 1996 malnutrition rates were nearly comparable to those of 1992. In the absence of emergency assistance, more Haitians would have fled Haiti, risking boat passage to seek refuge in the United States or swelling the refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay.

3. Political and social unrest. *Emergency assistance can help maintain social calm and mitigate political instability.*

The international community provided massive quantities of emergency assistance to Haiti (especially food aid). This helped offset the drop in incomes, increase in food prices, and temporary closure of donor-funded development activities caused by the embargo. The food aid acted as a steam valve during a period of political and economic stress: it reduced the probability of food riots and arguably had a dampening effect on political tensions. It was especially helpful in Port-au-Prince, where the urban poor who lost their jobs had few economic options.

However, emergency assistance may have had the unintended negative effect of reducing pressure on the repressive military regime, thereby working against the purpose of the embargo. It also may have delayed the external military intervention that finally took place in October 1994.

4. Distribution considerations. *Distribution of emergency food aid requires organization and control in order to prevent theft, guard against political manipulation, and protect beneficiaries.*

The large quantity of food aid injected into Haiti was conspicuous and highly valued. It became a source of violent competition—both for its direct value for consumption and as a source of political power for those controlling access. Violent elements hijacked food supplies in some areas. Urban homes and community buildings used to stockpile food supplies were looted. Some local authorities such as mayors used food to favor different political factions or for their personal aggrandizement. Fighting among beneficiaries sometimes erupted when food was delivered in urban neighborhoods for volunteers to distribute.

The NGOs addressed these problems by stocking and distributing food aid in more neutral settings (schools, factory yards), using ration cards to track the receipt of food aid, and having police or agency personnel present to control beneficiaries. These measures limited the diversion of food and reduced violence.

5. Relief to development. *During complex humanitarian emergencies, short-term relief programs understandably take precedence over long-term development activities.*

Employment in Haiti dropped dramatically because of the embargo. In response, USAID initiated the Jobs Creation project. It had two objectives: first, to create immediate employment for the poor, and second, to rehabilitate productive infrastructure (roads, irrigation). Some 500,000 person-months of short-term jobs were created during the 34-month project, and up to 20,000 people (including at least 20 percent women) were employed. The project was highly successful in providing short-term relief through job creation. It was less successful in promoting long-term development, because the infrastructure often did not meet technical standards or was not adequately maintained.

6. Development link: agriculture. *Emergency assistance that supplies agricultural production inputs contributes to long-term economic development if it enables rural households to reduce farm decapitalization and dependency on food aid.*

Some farmers in Haiti had been forced to sell their agricultural assets in order to survive. Accordingly, some NGOs provided seeds and tools (investment resources) as well as food commodities (consumption resources) as part of their emergency assistance. The agricultural inputs helped beneficiaries resume or maintain agricultural production and decrease their dependence on food relief.

7. Development link: capacity building. *Effective transition from emergency relief to economic*

recovery is hampered by inadequate planning for essential governance activities during the emergency.

Haiti's crisis and the urgency of the moment relegated forward planning (and other activities) to the back burner. Thus, no efforts were made to train a core of technocratic managers (in public administration and economics, for example) in anticipation of postconflict governance needs. Although USAID funded more than 1,900 microprojects to support democratic processes and reinforce local governmental structures, Haiti's public sector and institutional infrastructure still lacked the capacity, even in 1998, to manage the country's development.

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